ABSTRACT In this paper, a novel privacy-preserving signature scheme for network coding is proposed, which can mitigate both intra-generation and inter-generation pollution attacks efficiently, and leverage the inherent security property of random network coding to prevent eavesdropping attacks at the same time. Our scheme is constructed on a bi-linear map between two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same order, and its security relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. We proved that the construction of our scheme is correct, and also showed that our scheme is resistant against both pollution attacks and eavesdropping attacks by demonstrating that the probabilities of an adversary recovering the native messages and forging a valid signature for a bogus packet are both negligible functions of the security parameter. We evaluated the performance of our scheme in terms of communication overhead and computational complexity, and carried out extensive experiments to compare the running time of different procedures between our scheme and several previous schemes. The experimental results showed that our scheme is more efficient than the previous schemes simulated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the traditional store-and-forward routing mechanism, network coding (NC) provides a new paradigm for communication systems by allowing intermediate nodes to combine the received packets before forwarding them [1] . Over the past decades, network coding technique has been substantially proven to have a number of advantages, such as optimal throughput, enhanced robustness, and lower energy consumption. Beneficial from those features, network coding is particularly germane to be implemented in many applications, e.g., wireless ad hoc networks, P2P streaming networks, and large-scale content dissemination.
However, the packet-mixing nature of network coding also renders it more prone to pollution attacks. This problem is a major concern in network coded communication systems, because when pollution occurs, even the honest nodes will combine the corrupted packets with the valid ones and consequently the polluted traffic will be widely spread.
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Most existing techniques to combat pollution attacks in network coding can be divided into two classes, namely, information-theoretic approaches [2] - [4] and cryptographic approaches [5] - [16] . The information-theoretic schemes can merely passively tolerate pollution attacks at the destinations. In contrast, the cryptographic schemes enable intermediate nodes to detect and discard the bogus packets in transit, so that the pollution attack can be mitigated effectively from the origin. Therefore, this paper only focuses on the cryptographic schemes.
As discussed in [17] , in practical network coding architectures, the sender will separate the data into generations before transmission, where each generation consists of several packets and is uniquely identified by a generation identifier. What is worth mentioning is that only the packets belonging to the same generation can be combined by forwarders. This rule introduces a vital problem, that is, a valid packet of one generation is bogus to another with high probabilities, which means that the attacker can easily pollute a generation currently in transit by forwarding a packet of another generation without any modification of the packet content. As a result, in multi-generation transmission, there are two VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ kinds of pollution attacks to concern. The first kind is that the attacker tries to modify the packet content, which is termed as intra-generation pollution, whereas the second kind is that the attacker collects valid packets and use them to fake packets of other generations, which is termed as inter-generation pollution [15] . Unfortunately, most existing schemes were designed for pollution attacks in single-generation transmission and did not work well for multi-generation scenario. For example, the signature scheme proposed in [8] can prevent pollution attacks in multi-generation transmission only through updating the public key for every generation, and consequently significant communication overhead and start-up latency will be introduced. Recently, some papers have studied the inter-generation pollution attack problem, e.g., [15] , [16] . However, there exist obvious drawbacks in both of them. In detail, the scheme in [15] can be compromised by the attacker via collecting enough generations to derive the private key, and the scheme in [16] can only prevent inter-generation pollution attacks at destinations. Furthermore, all of the schemes mentioned above did not consider the eavesdropping attack, which may lead to information leakage to unauthorized users.
In this paper, we aim at addressing both eavesdropping and pollution attacks in the network coding enabled architectures simultaneously. Note that the pollution attacks studied in this paper include both intra-generation and inter-generation pollution attacks. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We proposed a novel privacy-preserving signature scheme for random linear network coding enabled communication systems. The novelty of our scheme is embodied in 1) the idea of encrypting a message before signing it so as to prevent both eavesdropping and pollution attacks, 2) authenticating both the generation identifier and the data block so as to prevent both intra/ inter-generation pollution attacks, and 3) a new designed construction of the signing and verification algorithms, where computational efficiency is enhanced.
• We showed the correctness of the construction of our scheme. We also proved the resistance of our scheme against both eavesdropping and pollution attacks via showing that both the probabilities of an attacker successfully recovering the native messages and generating a bogus packet which can pass the verification can be expressed as negligible functions of the security parameter.
• We compared our scheme with some existing schemes via carrying out extensive experiments. The experimental results show that compared to the existing schemes, our scheme outperforms in efficiency. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the network and threat models are presented. In Section III, the complete construction of our scheme is presented, followed with the proof of its correctness. In Section IV, the resistance of our scheme against eavesdropping attacks and pollution attacks (including both intra-generation and inter-generation) is proved. In Section V, the performance of our scheme in terms of communication overhead and computational complexity is evaluated. In addition, the comparison of running time in different procedures between our scheme and several previous schemes is conducted. In Section VI, some related works are surveyed. In Section VII, some conclusions are drawn.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we present the network model as well as the adversary model studied in this paper. The notations and their definitions which will be used throughout this paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we consider a linear network coding enabled communication system, where a source delivers a batch of sequenced messages to multiple receivers. We assume that each message can be regarded as an n-dimensional vector over the finite field F p , where p is a pre-determined prime integer. 1 As we mentioned earlier, the messages to transmit are grouped into multiple generations, where each generation is uniquely identified by a generation identifier and contains m native messages. Since this step introduces (m 2 ) communication overhead per generation, we set m n. Without loss of generality, we suppose that there are M generations, and the i-th generation is labeled by an ω-bit binary string Id i ∈ {0, 1} ω , where i ∈ {1, · · · , M } and ω ≥ log M 2 . 2 Let I = {Id 1 , · · · , Id M } represent the set of generation 1 Network coding does not require a finite field with prime order. The reason why we use such a field is that our scheme is based on bilinear maps, where the groups and finite field are with the same prime order p. 2 We require the generation identifier to be unpredictable, which can be easily achieved by generating an arbitrary random string. The length of Id i depends on how many generations the source needs to transmit. Without loss of generality, we assume that ω = |p| = log p 2 is sufficient to encode the generation identifier, where |p| = log p 2 (which is set to be 160 bits in this paper) represents the length of a finite field symbol.
identifiers, then the set of native messages belonging to the i-th generation can be expressed as x i,1 , . . . , x i,m , where
1) ENCODING AT THE SOURCE
Before the transmission of the i-th generation, for the j-th native message x i,j , the source appends an m-dimensional unit vector 1 j with the j-th entry being 1 and the others being 0 to it to create the corresponding augmented block u i,j , i.e.,
Let i = span{u i,1 , . . . , u i,m } denote the subspace spanned by the m augmented blocks of the i-th generation, then it corresponds with the i-th generation exactly and is uniquely identified by Id i . For the purpose of privacy preservation, the source encrypts each augmented block u i,j to generate the corresponding encrypted block
according to (9) , where c i,j ∈ F m p is the encrypted coding vector. Due to the intrinsic security brought by random linear network coding, encrypting only the coding vector is sufficient to prevent the eavesdropper from recovering the native messages correctly. It is because that with the encrypted coding vectors, the eavesdropper cannot get the correct coefficients of the linear equations need to be solved to recover the native messages. Similar to i , we let E i = span v i,1 , · · · , v i,m represent the vector subspace spanned by the m encrypted blocks of the i-th generation, then evidently it corresponds to Id i exactly as well. After that, the source generates a coded data block
where ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , m}, α j is randomly selected from F p , and then appends the generation identifier to it. Hence, a complete packet of the i-th generation to send can be written as
where σ is the digital signature of Y and can be computed according to (10) . For clarity, a demonstration of packet format and how the source generates a packet from the native messages is presented in Fig. 1 . respectively, it first computes the coded data block
where α j is randomly selected from F p , and then transmits the coded packet Y r = (Id i , w r , σ r ) (the algorithm to compute the coded signature σ r is given by (12) , which will be presented in Section III-B) along its outgoing link.
3) DECODING AT THE RECEIVERS
After receiving a valid packet, a destination first decrypts the data block and then stores it to the buffer if it is linearly independent to those data blocks already received. Once the destinations receive m linearly independent data blocks of a generation, they can recover the native messages via Gaussian Elimination and then send an ACK message to the source so as to switch to the transmission of the next generation.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that there exists an adversary attempting to launch attacks listed as follows.
• Eavesdropping attack: the adversary attempts to recover the native messages by collecting packets in transit and solving the linear equations.
• Pollution attack: the adversary attempts to disrupt the data transmission by injecting corrupted packets into the network. According to (4) and (6), it is easy to observe that given Id i , the data block of any legal packet Y = (Id i , w, σ ) in transit must be a linear combination of v i,1 , · · · , v i,m , which implies that w ∈ E i must hold. Accordingly, a corrupted packet can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 1: ∀Id i ∈ I, a packet Y = (Id i , w, σ ) is corrupted if and only if w / ∈ E i . As stated in [15] , the pollution attacks can be further divided into two categories, namely, intra-generation pollution attacks and inter-generation pollution attacks, which are defined in detail as follows.
• Intra-generation pollution attack: the attacker deliberately modifies the data block of a packet to generate a bogus one.
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• Inter-generation pollution attack: the attacker collects legal packets and uses them to fake packets of subsequent generations by modifying their generation identifiers.
III. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING HOMOMORPHIC SIGNATURE SCHEME A. PRELIMINARIES
In this subsection, we first present some preliminary knowledge about the bilinear map and the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DL problem) over a cyclic group, which are the basic foundations of our proposed scheme. Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order p, in which random sampling and group operation are efficiently computable. A bilinear pairing map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
ab .
• Non-degeneracy: Given the generator g of G, then e(g, g) generates the group G T .
• Computability: For any u, v ∈ G, e (u, v) is efficiently computable. Such a bilinear map can be constructed through Weil Pairing. 3 The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm (DL) problem over G, that is, for any x ∈ Z * p , given (g, g x ) where g is the generator of G, computing x is infeasible for any polynomial algorithm.
B. SCHEME CONSTRUCTION
In this subsection we present the complete construction of our scheme. The proposed privacy-preserving signature scheme can be formulated as a tuple of six probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) algorithms (Setup, Encrypt, Sign, Verify, Combine, Decrypt) with the following functionalities:
• Setup(1 λ , m, n). Given a security parameter 1 λ and two positive integers m, n, do: 1) Choose a prime number p > 2 λ .
2) Find two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G T of order p, where the generator of G is g. Then construct the bilinear map e :
• Encrypt(k, Id i , w). The source first generates a series of m-bit binary strings r j m j=1
, in which the j-th entry of r j being 1 and the others being 0. Then based on a keyed pseudo-random function f : {0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * ×K → F p , it generates the encryption matrix
. . .
where
For any data block w ∈ i , let c = (w 1 , · · · , w m ) and w p = (w m+1 , · · · , w m+n ) denote the coding vector and payload of w, respectively, we have
where c E = c · H E = (w 1 e i,1 , · · · , w m e i,m ). In this paper, the generation identifier is introduced as an input into the Encrypt algorithm to guarantee that the encryption matrices for every generation are different. In particular, for each augmented block u i,j , the source generates the corresponding encrypted block, which is given by
• Sign(sk, Id i , w). Let H : {0, 1} * → F p be a full-domain hash function modeled as a random oracle. 4 Given the generation identifier and a data block, the source computes the signature as
. Given the data blocks w j j=1 as well as the corresponding signatures σ j j=1 of the i-th generation, an intermediate node randomly selects α j 's from F p , and compute the coded block-signature pair (w r , σ r ), where
and
Hence, the combined packet to forward is given by Y r = (Id i , w r , σ r )
• Verify(pk, Id i , w, σ ). Given the public key pk, a generation identifier Id i , and a data block w as well as its signature σ , compute
If γ 1 = γ 2 , output 1 (accept), otherwise output 0 (reject). 4 There are many feasible constructions of H , and our proposed scheme in this paper does not rely on any particular one. Candidates of such a hash function can be found in [18] .
• Decrypt(k, Id i , w). Given the secret key k and the keyed pseudo-random function f , the destination computes e i,1 , . . . , e i,m and generates the decryption matrix
Let c E = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) denote the coding vector of w, then the decrypted coding vector is given by
Hence, the decrypted block can be written as
where w p = (w m+1 , . . . , w m+n ).
C. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
To be correct, the proposed scheme should satisfy the following conditions. 1) For any
The construction of our signature scheme is correct.
Proof: Given a data block w ∈ i , it is straightforward that w can be expressed as a linear combination of the augmented blocks of the i-th generation, i.e., w = According to the construction of our scheme, we have
where c E denotes the encrypted coding vector of w E and H E is the encryption matrix defined in (7) . Meanwhile, let
which implies that w D = w Therefore, condition 1) holds.
Furthermore, according to (10) and (13), we have
Similarly, according to (14) , we have
Therefore, we have γ 1 = γ 2 , which implies that
Hence, condition 2) holds as well. Assume that given Id i , Verify(pk, Id i , w j , σ j ) = 1 holds for any j ∈ {1, . . . , }. Then according to the Combine algorithm, we have w = j=1 α j w j and σ = j=1 σ α j j . We need to show that
According to the bilinear property of e, we have Therefore, it can be derived that γ 1 = γ 2 , which means that condition 3) holds as well. Conclusively, we complete the proof of the correctness.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
An adversary can break the proposed scheme in two ways:
• Given a generation identifier Id i , the adversary recovers the native messages {x i,j } m j=1 (or equivalently {u i,j } m j=1 ) by collecting enough packets in transit. We term this kind of attack as the eavesdropping attack.
• Given Id i , the adversary forges a data block-signature pair (w, σ ) such that w / ∈
E i
and Verify (pk, Id i , w, σ ) = 1. This allows the attacker to inject bogus packets into the network which will be accepted as valid. We denote this kind of attack as the pollution attack.
In what follows, we show that our scheme is resistant against both eavesdropping and pollution attacks.
A. RESISTANCE TO EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS

Definition 2:
Given Id i , we assume that the adversary collects a batch of q data blocks of the i-th generation, denoted by {w j } q j=1 . Then the proposed scheme is resistant to the eavesdropping attack if the probability that the adversary can recover the native messages from {w j } q j=1 is a negligible function of the security parameter, i.e.,
P[the native messages being recovered] ≤ negl(λ) (18)
Theorem 2: Our scheme is resistant to the eavesdropping attack.
Proof:
denote the data blocks of the i-th generation collected by the adversary. Then it is obvious that those data blocks can be expressed as linear combinations of the encrypted blocks of the i-th generation, i.e.,    w 1 . . .
where ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, z ∈ {1, . . . , m}, α j,z is randomly selected from F p and the matrix of α j,z 's is denoted by C D . Let
denote the coding matrix of the collected data blocks where c E,j is the coding vector of w j , then we have
denote the payload matrix of the collected data blocks where w p,j is the payload of w j , then we have
where x i,1 , · · · , x i,m are the native messages. Therefore, to recover the native messages, the adversary needs to derive C D at first and C D must be a full-rank matrix at the same time.
Thus, without the knowledge of the secret key, the probability of the native packets being recovered by the adversary can be written as P[the native packets being recovered] [19] , it can be derived that
Therefore, we have
This completes the proof.
B. RESISTANCE TO POLLUTION ATTACKS
Regarding the pollution attack (signature forgery), we formalize the notation in the following attack game, played by an adversary and a challenger.
Definition 3: The proposed scheme is secure (existentially unforgeable) if the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the following attack game is negligible in the security parameter.
• Setup. The adversary specifies two integers m and n to the challenger, then the challenger runs Setup(1 λ , m, n) to obtain pk and sk.
• Query. A adaptively submits the subspace E i (by submitting m linearly independent vectors {v i,j } m j=1 for each subspace) and the corresponding generation identifier Id i ∈ I. Let I q denote the set of generation identifiers queried by A. For each queried generation, the challenger computes the signatures
and sends them to the adversary.
• Forge. The adversary outputs an generation identifier Id * , a data block v * , and a signature σ * . The adversary wins the game if Verify(pk, Id * , v * , σ * ) = 1, and either (1) Id * / ∈ I q and v * = 0, or (2) Id * = Id i for some Id i ∈ I q and v * / ∈ E i . Theorem 3: Given the hardness of the DL problem in G, our scheme is secure. In particular, let A be the PPT adversary defined in Def. 3, then there exists a PPT adversary B of the same running time with A computing the discrete logarithm problem in G such that
where the advantage Sig-ADV[A, PPHSS] is defined to be the probability of A wining the game of Def. 3, and DL-ADV[A, G] denotes the advantage of B computing the discrete logarithm problem in G. Proof: We prove this theorem by two sequenced security games G 0 and G 1 . Denote by W 0 and W 1 the events that A wins the game G 0 and G 1 , respectively. Let G 0 be identical to the security game defined in Def. 3, whereas in G 1 , the private key sk is replaced by a truly random vector, i.e., instead of using the real private key in the Sign algorithm, the challenger randomly selects sk R ← − F m+n+1 and everything else remains the same. Hence, there exists a PPT adversary B computing the discrete logarithm problem such that
In G 1 , the challenger works as follows.
• Setup. The challenger randomly chooses sk
• Sign. A submits a query for a subspace {v i,j } m j=1 , Id i to the challenger. In response, the challenger computes
and sends {σ j } m j=1 to A. • Forge. A outputs a tuple (Id * , y * , σ * ). Suppose that the adversary A wins the security game G 1 with a forgery (Id * , y * , σ * ), then it must hold that
which implies that
According to Def. 3, we can classify the forgery into two types, namely,
• intra-generation forgery: Id * = Id i for some Id i ∈ I q and y * / ∈ E i .
• inter-generation forgery: Id * / ∈ I q and y * = 0. Denote the event that the intra-generation forgery happens by E 1 , whereas the event that inter-generation forgery happens by E 2 . Then it is straightforward that
When E 1 happens, we know that Id * = Id i for some Id i ∈ I q and y * / ∈ E i . Define a vector
Then it is straightforward that y ∈ E i . Meanwhile, define the signature of y as 
Dividing (24) by (25), we have
It can be verified that A wins the security game with a intra-generation forgery if and only it can find a tuple (y * , σ * ) which satisfies (26) . Since y * / ∈ E i and y ∈ E i , it is obvious that y * = y. Furthermore, since sk is a vector uniformly distributed in F m+n+1 p , the probability of (26) holding is exactly 1 p . Therefore, we can derive that
Similarly, when event E 2 occurs, we know that Id * / ∈ I q . To win the security game, A may use a vector y * ∈ E i , a signature σ * = m j=1 σ y * j j , and an arbitrary generation identifier Id * to satisfy (21) . However, the right hand side of (21) is a completely random value in G. Hence, we can derive that
Joining (27) and (28), we have
Therefore, it can derived that
This completes the proof. VOLUME 7, 2019
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In this paper, the communication overhead can be divided into two categories, namely, the off-line communication overhead and the on-line communication overhead. The former refers to something needs to be disseminated to all nodes before data transmission, such as the public key, while the latter refers to the data appended to the packets in transit, including the generation identifier, the coding vector, and the signature. In our scheme, there is no need to update the public key for the multi-generation verification. Hence, the public key can be distributed off-line prior to data transmission. And compared to data transmission, the start-up latency introduced by the off-line communication overhead is negligible.
Regarding the on-line communication overhead, the coding vector, generation identifier, and signature need to be encapsulated into the packet. Therefore, the on-line communication overhead per packet is given by
where |p| = log In this subsection, we evaluate the on-line computational complexity of our scheme during different procedures in terms of the number of finite field multiplications. It is worth mentioning that an exponentiation is equivalent to 1.5|p| multiplications over F p . Since the Setup procedure can be finished off-line before data transmission, and there is no need to update the public key for multiple-generation transmission, the computational complexity of the Setup procedure can be negligible.
Since both the Encrypt and Sign procedures are executed at the source, we evaluate the computational complexity of them simultaneously. It is easy to observe that to run the Encrypt algorithm, only one multiplication operation needs to be performed, whereas the Sign algorithm consumes 2m + n multiplication operations and one exponentiation operation. Hence, the computational complexity of the Encrypt and Sign algorithms per packet is given by O Encrypt+Sign = 2m + n + 1.5|p| + 1 (32) Let N denote the average number of packets combined in a generation. Then 1.5|p|(N + 1) multiplications are consumed by the combination of signatures. Considering that the standard network coding procedure requires (m + n)N multiplications, this term can be negligible.
According to (13) and (14), computing γ 1 consumes one bilinear map operation whereas computing γ 2 consumes one bilinear map operation, m + n + 1 exponentiations, and m + n + 1 multiplications. Therefore, we have
where O e denotes the computational complexity of the bilinear map e. Additionally, from (16) , it can be derived that the computational complexity is given by
C. EXPERIMENTS
In this subsection, we focus on evaluating the computational performance of our privacy-preserving homomorphic signature scheme in terms of running time during the Setup, Encrypt, Sign, and Verify procedures. We conducted several sets of experiments to compare our scheme with some previous bilinear map based signature schemes proposed in [9] and [20] . The experiments were carried out on a Levono Laptop with 2.7GHz Intel i7-7500U CPU and 8G DDR3 memory. The PBC (Pairing Based Cryptography) Library Version 0.5.14 5 was used for the implementation of our experiments. The bilinear map was constructed on the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the finite field F q where q = −1 mod 12 and G is a subgroup of E(F q ). It turns out that #E(F q ) = q + 1 and #E(F q 2 ) = (q + 1) 2 , so the embedding degree is k = 2 and hence G T is a subgroup of F q 2 . The order of both G and G T is p, which is some prime factor of q + 1. In our experiments, we fixed p with |p| = 160 bits, and all the results are taken as the mean value of 100 random trials. Figure 2 , 3, and 4 plot the comparison of running time between our scheme and several previous schemes in the Setup, Sign (with Encrypt in our scheme) and Verify procedure, respectively. As we can observe from Fig. 2 , as in the NCS1 scheme [9] , the running time of Setup procedure per generation in our scheme increases linearly from about 4 seconds to about 7.5 seconds as the packet length grows from 500 to 1000 finite field symbols, whereas that in the NCS0 scheme [9] and the scheme in [20] keeps steady around 16 and 24 milliseconds, respectively. Furthermore, according to the experimental results presented in Fig. 3 , in our scheme, the Sign and Encrypt procedures only take several milliseconds per packet. In comparison, the running time consumed by the Sign procedure of the schemes in [9] and [20] reaches up to seconds. In addition, as shown in Fig. 4 , the running time of the Verify procedure in our scheme per packet is almost equivalent to that of the NCS1 scheme in [9] , and is obviously less than that of the NCS0 scheme in [9] and the scheme in [20] .
From the experimental results we can observe that compared with the previous schemes simulated, our scheme performs worse in terms of the running time of the Setup procedure per generation, while outperforms significantly in terms of the running time of the Sign and Verify procedures. However, at a deeper look, we can also observe that since the Setup procedure needs to be executed off-line only once before data transmission, the disadvantage of our scheme in the Setup procedure will be significantly shrunk with the increase of number of generations. Hence, it is evident that compared to the superiority of our scheme in the running time of the Sign and Verify procedures, the disadvantage of that in the Setup procedure can be negligible, especially when the number of generations is sufficiently large. Therefore, by comprehensively considering the running time in different procedures, it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that our scheme is much more efficient than the previous schemes simulated. Table 2 shows the comparison of the running time in different procedures and in total per packet between different schemes when M = 100 and m = 30, which can be taken as an example to show the superiority of our scheme in efficiency.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In network coding enabled communication systems, security threats such as eavesdropping, traffic analysis, and pollution attacks have aroused extensive concern in recent years. In this section, we survey the existing schemes which aim to mitigating eavesdropping and pollution attacks in network coding enabled communication systems.
A. MITIGATING EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS
In network coding, one severe security concern is the eavesdropping attack, which can lead to information leakage to unauthorized users. Therefore, it is important to prevent the eavesdropping attack in order to guarantee that the data transmitted remains confidential to the legal users.
One way to address the eavesdropping attack is the information-theoretic approaches. The study of informationtheoretically secure network coding was pioneered by Cai and Yeung in [21] . In [22] , Cai and Yeung's model was strengthened to the strongly secure network coding. Subsequent to [21] , Rouayheb and Soljanin [23] , [24] proposed a construction scheme of secure network codes by using the secure codes for the wiretap channel II. Moreover, Silva et al. proposed a universal secure network coding scheme via the rand metric codes in [25] .
The approaches mentioned above aim at achieving perfectly secure transmission for network coding, where the eavesdropper obtains no information about the transmitted message from the messages it collects. Unlike them, Bhattad and Narayanan [26] proposed a weakly secure network coding scheme, where the attacker cannot decode any part of the source messages correctly. Similar schemes aiming at achieving weak security can be also found in [27] , [28] .
The other way to address the eavesdropping attack in network coding is the computational approaches. In [29] , Vilela et al. proposed a light-weight secure random linear network coding scheme, which leverages the inherent security potential of random linear network coding to provide end-to-end secrecy for data transmission. In [30] , [31] , Zhang et al. proposed a secure network coding scheme termed as ''P-coding'' to thwart the global eavesdropper in a transparent way, where data confidentiality was achieved via the permutation encryption performed on each message as well as its coding vector. Fan et al. [32] proposed a network coding based privacy preservation scheme via employing a homomorphic encryption system to encrypt the coding vectors of the messages. Furthermore, an efficient privacy-preserving network coding scheme based on compressed sensing was proposed recently [33] .
B. MITIGATING POLLUTION ATTACKS
Most existing techniques to address the pollution attack problem in network coding can be divided into two classes in general, namely, information-theoretic schemes and cryptography-based schemes.
Information-theoretic schemes try to prevent the pollution attack by detecting and correcting polluted packets at sink nodes. Yeung and Cai proposed a novel idea termed as ''Network Error Correction (NEC)'' in [2] , which can be regarded as a generalization of traditional error correction code. It can achieve error correcting in network coding through introducing redundancies in the space domain instead of the time domain. Based on NEC, several information-theoretic schemes were proposed to combat the pollution attack in network coding [3] , [4] . Given the effectiveness of the information-theoretic approaches, they cannot enable intermediate nodes to filter out the bogus packets, which implies that they can only passively tolerate the pollution attack at sink nodes.
The other way to address the pollution attack problem is the cryptography-based authentication techniques. Various authentication schemes have been recently proposed, aiming to detect and discard polluted packets at both intermediate nodes and sink nodes, detailed as follows.
The first class of authentication schemes are built on public-key techniques such as homomorphic signature and homomorphic hash function, which are conditionally secure under the assumption of the hardness of some well-known cryptographic problems such as the discrete logarithm problem.
In [34] , Krohn et al. proposed a novel homomorphic hash function to enable on-the-fly verification for erasure codes. Their scheme was then extended to network coding based P2P networks, and further enhanced in terms of computation complexity via enabling cooperative verification among different peers [35] . However, these schemes require a pre-established secure channel for the transmission of hash values prior to encoded messages.
Charles et al. [5] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme based on Weil Pairing over elliptic curves. Subsequently, another homomorphic signature scheme was proposed in [6] , which is based on RSA algorithm. For both of them, intermediate nodes can verify the packets in transit without decoding them and generate a new verifiable signature for the encoded packet without knowledge of the secret key by just encoding the signatures of the received packets. However, both of them require to update the public key for each generation to combat inter-generation pollution attacks.
In [7] , a homomorphic signature scheme based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem was proposed. In this scheme, data blocks are considered as vectors spanning a vector subspace. The verification procedure enables intermediate nodes to check whether a received packet belongs to a designated subspace, and thereby determine whether it is a valid one. Moreover, Zhang et al. presented a novel idea termed as ''padding for orthogonality'' for network coding in [8] , and then proposed a homomorphic subspace signature (HSS) scheme to prevent pollution attacks. Again, these schemes require to fresh the public-private key tuple.
In line with [7] , Boneh et al. proposed an improved scheme in terms of public key size and communication overhead [9] , where signing a linear subspace is sufficient to authenticate all the vectors in the same subspace. Liu and Wang [15] divided the pollution attacks in practical network coding into intra-generation and inter-generation pollution attacks, where the letter-one is identical to the repetitive attacks defined in [8] .
In addition to the asymmetric key-based authentication schemes, there also exists a class of schemes based on symmetric key encryption.
Yu et al. proposed an efficient scheme in [10] for securing XOR network coding against pollution attacks by exploiting probabilistic key pre-distribution and message authentication codes (MACs). In their scheme, multiple MACs are appended to the message at source, in which each MAC can verify a part of the message and the parts verified by different MACs are overlapped. By doing so, the polluted message can be filtered out with high probabilities through collaboratively verifying different parts by multiple intermediate nodes. Subsequently, Agrawal and Boneh [36] proposed a similar MAC-based authentication scheme, which differs from [10] in using single MAC to authenticate a whole packet. However, this scheme suffers from tag pollution. To address this issue, Li et al. [37] proposed a time-based authentication scheme termed as ''RIPPLE'', which employs the delayed disclosure of the MAC keys to achieve security akin to that of public-key verification schemes.
Cheng and Jiang [12] proposed a homomorphic MAC scheme for network coding, where they claimed that the scheme can achieve a reliable security parameter 1/q l by using only one key. However, Kim pointed out in [38] that the security parameter of the scheme in [12] is actually 1/q rather than 1/q l under the guessing attack.
Although the symmetric key-based authentication schemes are of lighter computational complexity than the asymmetric key-based ones, they still have several significant disadvantages, including larger bandwidth overhead and key management problem [8] .
In [16] , Liang et al. proposed a hybrid scheme which combines the homomorphic signature and homomorphic MAC to prevent both pollution attacks and repetitive attacks in network coded wireless sensor networks. However, it can only detect the packets suffering repetitive attacks at sink nodes, which leads to wide propagation of bogus packets and severe damage to throughput.
Recently, SadrHaghighi et al. proposed an ''identitybased digital signature scheme'' [39] to detect pollution attacks in intra-session network coding which does not involve a third-party query to certificate authority and eliminates the key escrow problem. Moreover, in [13] , Cheng et al. proposed two improved key distribution schemes for HSS [8] and KEPTE [40] , respectively, to combat multi-generation pollution attacks. In [20] , the authors proposed an identity-based signature scheme for network coding which is resistant to both pollution attacks and ID attacks. In [41] , Li et al. proposed a homomorphic signature scheme for multi-source network coding to mitigate pollution attacks. Fiandrotti at al. [42] proposed a simple yet effective approach to cope with the pollution attack in NC based P2P streaming. Such scheme can mitigate the effect of pollution attacks via selectively combining the packets at forwarders with a probability that increases with the age of them. However, all the schemes mentioned above did not consider eavesdropping attacks.
In [43] , Kim et al. proposed a novel monitoring scheme called Algebraic Watchdog to detect node misbehaviors such as pollution attacks probabilistically by allowing intermediate nodes to overhear transmissions of their neighbors in network coding architectures. Subsequently in [44] , Antonopoulos et al. introduced a cooperative nonparametric statistical framework to identify and mitigate node misbehaviors in network coding scenario, which does not require monitoring of the neighboring transmission. Unfortunately, both of the schemes mentioned above are not resistant against eavesdropping attacks either.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving network coding signature scheme, which leverages the intrinsic security potential of random network coding to prevent eavesdropping attacks, and enables every intermediate node to detect and discard bogus packets to mitigate pollution attacks. We first presented the full construction of our scheme and then proved that the construction is correct. Thereafter, we showed that our scheme is resistant to both eavesdropping attacks and pollution attacks, given the assumption of the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem over a cyclic group. We also evaluated the communication overhead and the computational complexity of our scheme. To compare our scheme with some previous schemes, We carried out extensive experiments on the running time of different procedures. The experimental results showed that our scheme is more efficient than the previous schemes simulated.
